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Tom Regan's seafaring dog that is justifiably thrown 
out of the lifeboat built for four to save the lives of four 
humans has been the topic of much discussion. Critics 
have argued in a variety of ways that this dog nips at 
Regan's achilles heel. Without reviewing previous 
discussions, with much of which I certainly agree, I 
wish to develop an unexplored approach to exposing 
the vulnerability of the position which Regan takes on 
sacrificing the dog to save the humans. I will argue that 
when dealing with the seafaring dog Regan abandons 
his own principles and that this is exactly what he should 
do. Regan should abandon his view that all subjects-
of-a-life have equal inherent worth. 
Inherent and Intrinsic Worth 
Regan makes a theoretically significant distinction 
between two kinds of value, intrinsic and inherent. 
Intrinsically valuable things are experiences like 
pleasures or preference satisfactions.' Inherently 
valuable things are individual subjects of a life. 2 
Presumably, both intrinsic and inherent values are 
desirable for their own sakes and are ends in themselves. 
Regan fails to make a clear conceptual or definitional 
distinction between intrinsic and inherent values. He 
recognizes that intrinsic value has been defined as: 
"what is desired for its own sake," "what would be good 
even if it existed in isolation from everything else, what 
ought to exist for its own sake," and "what is valued or 
preferred in itself."3 But inherent values are defined 
in much the same language as "having value in 
themselves,"4 or as "ends in themselves."s Regan 
differentiates between intrinsic and inherent values 
primarily by example rather than formally or 
conceptually, and this distinction would work just as 
well as a pluralistic theory of intrinsic good which 
affirms that more than one kind of thing---e.g. pleasures 
and individuals--are valuable in and of themselves. 
Nevertheless, inherent values are incommensurate 
with and not reducible to intrinsic values, Regan insists. 
A pluralistic theory of intrinsic value could also make 
such a claim. Regan explains that "we cannot determine 
the inherent value of individual moral agents by totaling 
the intrinsic values of their experiences. Those who have 
a more pleasant or happier life do not therefore have 
greater inherent value than those whose lives are less 
pleasant orhappy."6 This could be just as well expressed 
by saying that individual subjects-of-a-life and their 
pleasant experiences both have intrinsic value and that 
the value of the former is incommensurate with and 
not reducible to the value of the latter. I will continue 
to use Regan's language, however. 
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Subjects-of-a-life are described as having 
beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and 
a sense of the future, including their own 
future; an emotional life together with feelings 
of pleasure and pain; preference and welfare-
interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit 
of their desires and goals; a psychophysical 
identity over time; and an individual welfare 
in the sense that their experiential life fares 
well or ill for them, logically independently 
of their utility for others and logically 
independently of their being the object of 
anyone else's interests.7 
Not all animals are subjects-of-a-life, but normal 
mammals a year old or more clearly are; and many other 
animals who lack some of the above traits should be 
given the benefit of the doubt, Regan thinks.8 I will 
follow Regan in using the word "animal" hereafter to 
refer to those which clearly are subjects-of-a-life. Both 
moral agents who have moral duties and moral patients 
to whom duties are owed are subjects-of-a-life (at least· 
if they are normal mammals a year old or more) and 
thus are inherently valuable.9 
Regan insists that all animals (in the above sense) 
have equal inherent value, that the notion is categorical 
and not comparative; but the experiences of individual 
animals may have very unequal intrinsic value. 
Conscious individuals may differ significantly in 
pleasures or desire satisfactions while remaining equal 
as subjects-of-a-life. Regan correctly affirms that 
traditional utilitarians, who emphasize pleasures or 
desire satisfactions, and perfectionists, who emphasize 
virtues and talents, recognize only intrinsic value but 
not inherent value in individual centers of conscious 
experience and activity. According to these ethical 
theories, individual centers of conscious experience and 
activity have the instrumental worth of an empty bucket 
or receptacle into which intrinsically good stuff like 
pleasures or talents can be poured; but the receptacles 
themselves have no intrinsic or inherent worth. 
Traditional utilitarianism and perfectionism did not 
recognize that individuals are ends in themselves. 10 
I think we should agree with Regan that individual 
centers ofconscious experience, whether human or non-
human, are valuable in and of themselves and that their 
value is more than the sum of the value of the universal 
and repeatable goods like pleasure, talent, knowledge, 
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virtue, or what have you, that they exemplify.ll I will 
not argue further for this here, but obviously this claim 
may be accepted while rejecting Regan's further claim 
that all animals (normal mammals) have equal inherent 
worth because they are all equally subjects-of-a-life. 
Regan contends "subject-of-a-life" is a categorical 
concept, that there can not be degrees of it "depending 
on the degree to which they have or lack some favored 
abili ty or virtue."12 
Despite Regan's insistence to the contrary, it seems 
to me that there are degrees ofbeing the subject-of-a-
life. By degrees I mean that subjects-of-a-life differ 
immensely with respect to 
l. the complexity of their organization, 
2. the extent to which they exemplify the defining 
characteristics of the notioll, and 
3. the richness with which they may manifest 
additional traits of subjectivity conspicuously 
absent from Regan's list like rationality, self-
consciousness, moral agency, etc .. 
All of the defining characteristics in Regan's notion of 
a subject-of-a-life are ability or capacity concepts, and 
there can be and indeed are all sorts of degrees of each 
of these characteristics to be found among species of 
normal mammals, humans included. Regan does not 
pickj ust one or two favored abilities or virtues; he picks 
a large assortment of them. Yet, all of the abilities Regan 
includes can and do exist as degrees of ability or 
capacity and as actualized properties in various species 
and individuals. 
Regan does not avoid favoring preferred abilities 
(perfectionism) just because his list includes a large 
conglomeration of them! Look carefully at his concept 
of subject-of-a-life and you will realize that among 
mammals there are many degrees of the abili ties to have 
beliefs, desires, perceptions, memories, a sense of the 
future including one's own, emotions, feelings of 
pleasure and pain, preference and welfare interests, 
ability to initiate action in pursuit of desires and goals, 
psychophysical identity over time, and individual 
welfare. It may be difficult and at times impossible to 
measure carefully and compare all of these differences, 
but they clearly exist among subjects-of-a-life, and they 
are the defining characteristics of such subjects. 
It might be replied that all mammals as wholes are 
still equally subjects-of-a-life even though their parts 
differ in degrees, that the preceding argument commits 
a fallacy of composition. However, it is not always a 
fallacy to reason from parts to wholes;13 and it is not at 
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all implausible that if two mammals (say a human and 
a dog) differ significantly in their capacities for 
emotions, satisfactions, pleasures and pains, etc., they 
differ in the degree to which they are subjects-of-a-life 
since these are among the defining characteristics of 
such subjects. It might also be replied that being the 
subject-of-a-life consist not simply of the presence of 
these defining abilities but also of the unique way in 
which they are integrated into the complex subjectivity 
of each distinctive individual. Unfortunately, this turn 
to uniqueness can not be used to defend Regan's 
contention that all mammals are subjects-of-a-life 
equally. The latter is presumably something they all have 
in common, but uniqueness is something by which they 
all differ. Of course, all unique things have uniqueness 
in common, but since uniqueness means being different, 
this says only that what they have in common is being 
different, not that they are equally subjects of a life. 
Regan should conclude that animals are not all equal 
with respect to the value of being unique subjects-of-a-
life because they differ immensely with respect to the 
complexity and richness of their properties as such. 
Regan's Seafaring Dog 
Let us now apply the above reflections to the case of 
Regan's ill fated dog who must be cast overboard to 
save the lives of four humans on a four person only 
raft. Is it right or wrong for the four persons to jettison 
the dog to save themselves? Regan insists that to harm 
individual subjects-of-a-life 
merely in order to produce the best conse-
quences for all involved-is to treat them 
unjustly-because it fails to respect their 
inherent value. To borrow part ofa phrase from 
Kant, individuals who have inherent value 
must never be treated merely as a means to 
securing the best aggregate consequences.14 
By the best aggregate consequences Regan means 
the given totality of the intrinsic values of pleasure, 
preference fulfillment, etc. Applied to the lifeboat 
situation, it would appear at first to be unjust to harm 
(Le. drown) the dog merely to produce the best 
aggregate consequences for the four humans because 
doing so would fail to respect the dog's inherent value 
and would treat it merely as a means to securing the 
most pleasure, preference fulfillment, etc. for the men. 
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However, Regan's worse-off principle is supposed to 
save the day for the humans and doom the dog. Regan 
writes that "Our belief that it is the dog who should be 
killed is justified by appeal to the worse-off principle."15 
Regan's miniride principle would allow sacrificing the 
life of one individual where necessary to save the lives 
of many when harms to each are comparable; but his 
worse-off principle forbids sacrificing the life of one 
individual where necessary to save the lives of many 
when the harms to each are not comparable. However, 
it permits sacrificing the life of one individual to save a 
second individual if the death of the second would be 
worse than the death of the firsL 16 Thus, if the harm 
that would befall the dog if drowned is comparable to 
the harm that would befall each of the humans if 
drowned, it would be wrong to sacrifice the dog. Regan 
argues, however, that the harms would not be 
comparable, that the death of the person would be worse 
than the death of the dog, and that it is therefore 
justifiable to drown the dog. Indeed, for this reason it 
would be justifiable if necessary to throw a million dogs 
overboard to save one human. I? As Regan expresses it, 
All on board [the lifeboat] have equal inherent 
value and an equal prima facie right not to be 
harmed. Now, the harm that death is, is a 
function of the opportunities for satisfaction 
it forecloses, and no reasonable person would 
deny that the death of any of the four humans 
would be a greater prima facie loss, and thus a 
greater prima facie harm, than would be true 
in the case of the dog. Death for the dog, in 
short, though a harm, is not comparable to the 
harm that death would be for any of the 
humans. To throw anyone of the humans 
overboard, to face certain death, would be to 
make that individual worse-off (Le. would 
cause that individual a greater harm) than the 
harm that would be done to the dog if the 
animal was thrown overboard. 18 
It is indeed unfortunate that Regan seems to forget 
his distinction between inherent and intrinsic value 
when he analyzes the harm ofdeath. His great failure 
here is that he focuses exclusively on the loss of 
opportunities for the realization of intrinsic value 
("satisfaction"). However, if individual subjects-of-a-
life do indeed have inherent value as well as 
opportunities for the realization of intrinsic value, surely 
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death involves much greater harm than a mere loss of 
opportunities for satisfaction. It also involves the 
extinction and loss ofall the inherent worth ofbeing a 
unique subject-of-a-life.U Regan is right that this is equal 
for all such subjects, then death is just as great a loss in 
this important respect for the dog as for the humans. 
It is true that nonnal humans would typically have 
more opportunities for satisfaction than a normal dog. 
This might not be so in the unusual circumstances 
described by Judith Barad-Andrade in which the four 
humans at sea all "work in the same assembly line... , 
have a cynical attitude toward life, are companionless, 
and when not at work can almost always be found in 
front of the television set," and the seafaring dog by 
contrast "has close ties with her human family, has 
puppies waiting for her at home, enjoys riding in the 
car and long walks, and has an interest in investigating 
new places and meeting new creatures" and has recently 
"displayed her courage and loyalty by rescuing a young 
friend from a burning building."19 But let us assume 
that the dog is a couch potato and the humans are 
intensely involved morally and aesthetically with others 
and with the world. Then their opportunities for 
satisfaction would, as Regan suggests, outweigh those 
of the dog; but this shows only that their loss of intrinsic 
value would be greater. It does not show that their loss 
of inherent value would be greater than the dog's loss 
of the same. In fact, their lost of inherent value would 
be identical if Regan is right that all subjects-of-a-life 
have equal inherent worth. Regan claims that "The 
selection of the dog does not conflict with recognizing 
the animal's equal inherent value... "20 but it most 
certainly does because it ignores the fact that extinction 
of the animal's inherent value would be just as great a 
loss for it as would the extinction of one of the human's 
inherent value, if indeed their inherent values are equal. 
Regan seems to think that casting the dog overboard is 
not incompatible with recognizing its equal inherent 
value because the dog's losses are not outweighed by 
summing up the losses of the group of humans in the 
lifeboat,21 but the real incompatibility arises simply by 
not allowing equal inherent value to count and by basing 
the choice upon the unequal intrinsic worth of the dog 
and one of the humans. Equal rights supposedly depend 
on equality of inherent worth, but in the lifeboat 
situation inequalities of intrinsic worth give the person 
stronger rights to life and freedom from harm. 
Regan considers the possibility that those in the 
lifeboat should draw straws as an expression of equal 
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respect for each contender for life instead of sacrificing 
the dog in preference to one of the humans; but he rejects 
this possibility on the grounds that "no reasonable 
person would suppose that the dog has a 'right to life' 
that is equal to the humans' or that the animal should 
be given an equal chance in the lottery for survival."22 
However, a lottery like drawing straws is precisely the 
correct moral strategy for choosing among equals when 
lifesaving resources are too scarce to save all. Regan 
rejects a lottery only at the price of ignoring his own 
cherished doctrine of equality of inherent worth among 
subjects-of-a-life. In the fmal analysis, on Regan's view, 
all that we need to consider is unequal intrinsic worth. 
Regan's resolution of the lifeboat case depends 
entirely upon inequalities of intrinsic value, despite 
equalities of inherent value. He may not aggregate these 
by summing up the future pleasures or satisfactions of 
all four of the human survivors and weighing these 
against the future pleasures or satisfactions of one dog 
or even a million dogs; but it is unclear why this should 
not be done once the decision has been made to regard 
the loss of intrinsic values as the only undesirable 
consequence of death. Regan certainly does aggregate 
the future satisfactions of the one dog and weigh them 
to fmd them wanting compared to the future satisfactions 
of one of the humans. If satisfactions can be aggregated 
and compared within two individuals, why shouldn't 
they be aggregated between many individuals? Regan 
simply ignores the supposedly equal inherent worths 
of the man and the dog, and justifies drowning the dog 
solely on the basis of inequalities of future satisfactions, 
i.e. on differences of intrinsic value, or on the best 
aggregate consequences. It is as if Regan thinks that 
equal inherent worths cancel out one another when one 
life must be chosen against another. Regan insists that 
"individuals who have inherent value are not to be 
treated as if they were mere 'receptacles' of valuable 
experiences (e.g., pleasures) ... "23; but once equal 
inherent values are allowed to cancel out one another, 
what remains is merely individuals as receptacles. 
If I am right, however, that all subjects-of-a-life do 
not have equal inherent worth, and if, as they typically 
are, the human subjects-of-a-life are indeed much more 
complex, intense, and richer in properties than that of 
the dog, then casting the dog overboard is justified bOth 
in terms of inherent and intrinsic value. The dog has 
both less inherent worth as a unique individual and 
fewer opportunities for future satisfactions than the 
humans, and for both of these reasons it is unreasonable 
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to suppose that the dog has a right to life that is equal to 
that of the humans or that it should be given an equal 
chance in the lottery for survival. 
There is a sense, of course, in which planet earth is 
a giant lifeboat situation in which some individuals must 
die to save otllers from deaili. Much human experimen-
tation on animals is commercial rather ilian medical, 
and much medical experimentation aims at developing 
the means to prevent harms (like discomforts, 
dysfunctions, or deformities) that are less severe ilian 
the loss of life. Still, some medical experimentation on 
animals clearly aims at saving lives or preventing 
premature deaths for both animals and humans. Both 
Regan's reasoning and my own would seem to justify 
such experimentation on animals, especially if it has a 
reasonable probability of success. Indeed, Regan's 
reasoning would justify terminal experiments on 
millions of animals just to save one normal human 
being. Either the animals or the person will .die 
prematurely, ilie former in terminal medical experi-
ments, ilie latter from some terminal disease for which 
we presently have no cure. In considering toxicity tests 
of new drugs, Regan argues that animals should not be 
used because they have not voluntarily pla~d themselves 
at risk for such perils,24 but Regan does not consider 
whether the seafaring dog voluntarily agreed to go to 
sea. In the lifebo:lt situation, this consideration is 
irrelevant, so it should be equally irrelevant in the lifeboat 
of toxicity testing. So, should the animals be "thrown 
overboard" to save the human? Regan's answer must be 
affmnative, given his solution to ilie case of the seafaring 
dog, because anticipated harms to each are incomparable, 
Le. because the loss of opportunities for satisfaction for 
the person is much greater than the loss of satisfaction 
for anyone of the animals. I would agree, but I would 
add that ilie loss of the inherent worth ofbeing the subject-
of-a-life is also greater for me person than for me dog, 
because the inherent worm ofeach is also incomparable. 
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